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MERLIN News Story"-->
No Excuses, Only Explanations Written by: The Anonymous One Many people have been asking some hard questions since April 5th, 2000. At 1930 PST on that day, Seattle Fire Department was on the scene of a developing fire at 5400 1/2 22nd Avenue North West, a landmark building in the Ballard Neighborhood of Seattle, Washington. The building was of classic ordinary construction with a brick exterior structure and wood and timber interior construction. The first floor was occupied by Jones Bros. Meat Market from the time of original construction and the second and third floors were a number of low-rent studio type apartments. During the course of battling that blaze at least two fire fighters were injured. The potential for additional injuries, and even death, to Seattle fire fighters was a very real possibility. It is believed that the seriousness of the situation requires a deeper look at the problem and solutions, rather than a casual acceptance of the risks of fire fighting or a quick fix which is intended to silence critics of the City's policies. The central allegation against the City of Seattle is that the Mayor and Seattle City Council have failed to adequately fund and maintain the Seattle Fire Department. This lack of adequate funding resulted in the Seattle Fire Department's use of an apparatus which was known to be potentially dangerous. Insufficient funding has contributed to the lack of substantive training for fire fighters and specialty personel resulting in injury of fire fighters at the scene of this and other fire department operations. Allegations concerning the administrative arm of the Seattle Fire Department include their failure to place dangerous equipment out of service after being warned several times of the problems that have plagued that specific make and model of ladder. Further, the Department has systemic problems in off-shift hiring practices which puts anyone in any position regardless of their level of expertise and experience. The lack of live fire training within the ranks of the Seattle Fire Department has further served to seriously undermine the safety and effectiveness of fire ground operations. The cavalier attitude of many staff officers and some chief officers has served to lead firefighters down a road which results in the injury of department members. Allegations concerning the Department of Labor and Industries appear to be even more grievous: The ongoing practice of granting variances has created safety problems and allows the department to continue the practice of paying lip service to safey. It is further alleged that the current investigation into the activities of April 5 and 6, 2000, are being inappropriately coordinated by the Department of Labor and Industries, a contributor to the injuries incurred at that time. These are serious allegations but they are supported by established facts. I have spoken with a number of Seattle Fire Fighters regarding the events of that evening and the next morning. Each of these individuals has asked to remain anonymous in providing the information discussed in this report, for fear of retaliation by the City of Seattle. I would hope that there is no such retaliation against individuals willing to confront the facts and search for honest solutions. There can be no excuses, only explanations. We, as a group of Seattle Fire Fighters, "The Leaders in Fire and Life Safety", should not accept anything less than the truth and use this as a true learning experience. I, for one, have attended enough funerals in my career and do not relish the idea of attending another. The Collapse of Apparatus 359 Apparatus number 359 was built in 1980 and sits on a Ward-LaFrance chassis. It was purchased new by the City of Seattle in the year of its construction. The ladder was built by Maxim and its construction is of welded tubular steel. A review of several trade publications revealed a number of failures involving Maxim ladders of the same era. Reports of the ladder structure rusting from the inside-out also exist. Further, a contact within the Seattle Fire Department indicates that a similar unit was condemned by the Department of Labor and Industries due to structural problems with the ladder, which then granted a one-year variance allowing continued use of the apparatus as a reserve unit. An on-scene source from within the department states that the collapse occurred at approximately 0200 on April 6. According to more than one source who was present at that time, the ladder was fully extended (100 feet in length) and standing at somewhere very close to 22 degrees from a fully horizontal position. According to another source, a label on the ladder unit specifies that Maxim specified the maximum extension of the ladder, with a single individual at the end of the ladder at 21 degrees, would be 53 feet. In the case at hand, my source indicates that a probationary fire fighter was instructed to climb to the top of the ladder - a fire fighter with an approximate load weight of 310 lbs. It is important to note that Maxim clarified their 'single individual' rating of the ladder to be a person weighing 200 lbs. According to another fire fighter, the probationary member was told, just prior to mounting the ladder, that the ladder had a habit of twisting counter-clockwise. He was instructed to remain to the right side of the ladder, in an attempt to apply compensating leverage. According to sources on-scene at the time of the collapse, the ladder rotated over while the firefighter was at the top, then broke in half. See also Break Point and Break Point 3. Additional pictures of Apparatus 359:
According to a ladder-man who had worked on apparatus 360, the sister unit to the ladder which collapsed, there were three 'reserve' Ladder units in the department: Apparatus 316, a Kenworth currently housed at Station 25; 359; and 360, another Ward-LaFrance, currently at the Fire Garage. The Department of Labor and Industries is reported to have 'condemned' the ladder of Apparatus 360 due to a lack of structural integrity. The common thread which runs between these units is the Maxim ladder which sits atop each of these vehicles. L & I has, apparently, informed the Seattle Fire Department that their investigation takes priority over any well-being of departmental members, insisting on holding off the Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) debreifing of members until after L & I had been able to interview these members. Unsubstantiated rumor also says that L & I has put pressure on the Department to conduct interviews of injured members, even while hospitalized and under heavy medication. The Injury of Lt. Chris Yob I know, personally, that Lt. Chris Yob is a fine, intelligent member of the Seattle Fire Department. While conducting a search of the third floor of the burning structure, with two other members of his team his SCBA began to ring, alerting everyone that his air supply was low. I assume that he was unable to hear his own low-pressure bell due to the extensive environmental noise. When his air supply was depleted, he took his mask hose and placed it in his bunking gear, in an attempt to filter his air supply and buy additional time to escape the fire. Soon, another member of the team assisted in a 'quick-fill,' attempting to transfer air to Lt. Yob's SCBA bottle. Because his low pressure hose had been removed and the main valve was not closed, the transfer of air did not work and the supplied air was immediately discharged through the open regulator. Taking in massive quantities of carbon monoxide, apparently disoriented and concerned about his life and safety, he took what appeared to be his only way out of the building, jumping through a window (the window above the "E") to what he believed was a single floor drop to an adjacent building. Reports indicate that Chris hit a 'chicken-wire-fence' on the adjacent roof, causing him to bounce off and drop an additional two stories to the ground, below. Additional pictures of the scene:
The report to the Chief of the Seattle Fire Department, Mr. James Sewell, by the Joint Labor Management Safety Committee which pointed out concerns regarding the lack of live-fire training and the building of a new training facility appear to be very much "on-point." This lack of committment to employee safety has served to undermine the relationship between the employer and the employee. This is not the Seattle Way, nor is it conducive of a thriving work environment. I believe that the facts are clear: The City of Seattle has failed to adequately fund the Seattle Fire Department. Every problem discussed in this report is founded on this basic fact. I am left to conclude that we are very lucky that we did not lose another fire fighter in this disaster. The Anonymous One is a 13 year veteran of the Seattle Fire Department with a broad array of operations experience. Tao can be reached at: tao@ndcrt.org |
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All contents copyright 1996 - 2005 by Bob Nelson |
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